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 The Role of the King in Democracy in Thailand 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
 The transition towards democracy in Thailand has been one of the most unique in 
the world.  It began in 1932 with the overthrow of the absolute Monarchy and the 
creation of a constitutional monarchy that eventually evolved into a parliamentary 
system.  But today the transition remains far from complete.  Thailand has created many 
democratic practices and institutions, but they are often ineffective and are frequently 
subject to undemocratic practices and traditions. 
 One of the main reasons the transition has been so unique and complicated is the 
presence and role of the monarchy itself.  Historically, the monarchy in Thailand has 
played a large role in every aspect of Thai life - political, social and cultural.  The King’s 
place in Thai society is a very central one, and one that is deeply imbued with Buddhist 
ideology, which is pervasive throughout the culture of Thailand.  While there are many 
complexities to be explained in regards to the Monarchy’s relationship with the nation of 
Thailand, this thesis will examine the role of the current king solely in regards to the 
democratic transition. 
Theories 
 There are many theories regarding democratic transitions.  In this thesis, I will be 
evaluating the traditional role of the institution of the monarchy in democratic transitions 
using Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of “transformation” from his books, The Third 
Wave and Political Order in Changing Societies. 
 In The Third Wave,  Huntington offers his theory of democratic transition.1  In his 
chapter titled “How? Processes of Democratization,” Huntington explains that there are 
three types of traditional democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes; 
transformations, replacements, and transplacements.  A transformation occurs when the 
democratic transition is initiated “from above” by those in power.  A replacement occurs 
when the oppositions overthrow the current government. A transplacement occurs when 
there is a compromise between those in the government and the opposition, and both 
parties agree to democratize.  
 “The three crucial interactions in democratization processes were those between 
government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing 
collations, and between moderates and extremists in the oppositions.”2  The relative 
balance of power between these groups determines the type of transition that takes place. 
 The type of transition that has been taking place in Thailand is a transformation.  
A transformation is when “those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and 
play the decisive role in ending that regime and changes it into a democratic system.”3  
This was the situation in Thailand when the bureaucratic elite made the decision to 
democratize, with the forced consent of the King.  Huntington states that in a 
transformation the balance of power is such that the government is stronger than the 
oppositions and thus takes the lead in initiating the transition.  In this type of transition, 
Huntington highlights the importance of the emergence of reformers in the current 
regime, their motives for democratization, their ability to weaken “standpatters,” or hard-
                                                        
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, (University of Oaklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 122-143 
2 Ibid. 
3 Id. p. 124 
liners in the regime, and their ability to placate the opposition.  All of these aspects shape 
the nature of the transition and determine its outcome. 
 An important aspect of this type of transition is called “backward legitimacy.” 
Backward legitimacy “legitimated the new order because it was product of the old, and it 
retrospectively legitimated the older order because it had produced the new.”4  This 
practice gives the reformers more control over the democratic transition. This idea is 
especially apparent and important in Thailand’s transition.  The reformers in the regime 
implement the practice of backward legitimacy through the institution of the monarchy. 
 Huntington offers another theory regarding transitions in his book Political 
Change in Traditional Polities.5  This theory more specifically outlines the role and 
dilemma of a monarchy in transformations.  Huntington explains that modernization 
causes changes in society, in that “it creates new social groups and new social and 
political consciousness.”6  As a result, new groups of people demand participation in 
government.  “The participation of these groups in politics seemingly could only come at 
the price of the monarchy.”7 The main problem he cites is the inability of a monarchy to 
the transfer the traditional source of political legitimacy and authority to democratic 
institutions to allow room for these new groups of people. Huntington argues, the more 
centralized power and authority is in the institution of the monarchy, the more difficult 
the transfer of power will be.  This “tension” is especially relevant in the case of 
Thailand, and is the main issue the King of Thailand faces in the current democratic 
transition. 
                                                        
4 Ibid. 
5 Samuel P. Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, Yale Unveristy Press, 1968) 
pp. 167-191 
6 Id. p. 167 
7 Id. p. 177 
Combating traditional beliefs 
 In evaluating the transition in Thailand and comparing it with Huntington’s 
theory, I will be challenging some commonly held beliefs about the King’s role in the 
democratic process there. 
 The first is the idea that the since the revolution of 1932, the King is no longer 
involved in politics or remains “above politics.”  While many people would like to 
believe this, I argue that the King has been and is quite active in politics, both directly 
and indirectly.  Direct intervention by the King will be examined and explained in more 
detail in three chapters below describing the events of key periods in Thai history:  1973-
76, 1992, and 2006.  These provide specific examples of how the King directly 
intervened in governmental affairs, and explain how the people and the government have 
perceived his involvement. 
 The second commonly held belief is that the King is the “protector of democracy” 
and that his involvement in the democratic transition is both positive and necessary.  This 
comes really to the core of my argument.  Many people believe that due to the central 
role the King plays in Thai society, and previously in Thai politics, the transition to 
democracy requires his constant involvement and  oversight..  Propping up this belief are 
two central ideas: (1) That the King is pro democracy and will support and further 
democratic principles and reforms, and (2) that the King, often heralded as the  symbolic 
“father” of the nation and the source of political and national legitimacy, is appropriately 
involved because ultimately he and only he can decide what is best for “his children,” 
meaning the people of Thailand.  It is often believed that no matter what the 
circumstances, the King is always acting in the best interests of the nation because he is 
symbolic of national unity.  
 I contend that while certain historical events could be construed as displaying the 
King always in support of democracy, at the heart of those actions was not democratic 
progress, but desire for unity and stability in the nation in line with the King’s 
“conservative” mentality.  I do not contest the importance of the King to the Thai people 
and in Thai society, and I agree that up to a point his assistance in the democratic 
transition has been helpful.  However, I do not believe that he has or will always act in 
the best interest of the “people” when it comes to achieving full democratization.  At key 
points his interests have not lined up with those of democracy for the people.  Under 
Huntington’s theory of democratic transition, for democracy to truly take hold, the elite 
figure that plays a part in bringing about the transition must eventually cede their 
traditional source of legitimacy.  My thesis is that the King has not done this and actually 
has no intention of doing so; and therefore he is not a true supporter of democracy, but 
actually an impediment to its full growth. 
Method of Advancement 
 The following describes the process by which I advance my argument and offer 
evidence in support.  These chapters discuss specific events in Thai history in which the 
King intervened directly in Thai politics.  While many believes his intervention was “in 
the interest” of furthering the democratic transition, I outline these events to emphasize 
(1) that the King does in fact intervene in politics and (2) that his continuing actions are 
ultimately detrimental to the complete growth of democracy. 
Chapter 1: 
 The first chapter provides a summary of the prominent kings in the Chakri 
dynasty (of which the King is the latest successor).  I explain the process of 
modernization initiated by the these kings, beginning with Rama 4 in 1880 up until Rama 
7, the last king before the revolution of 1932.  This information is important in order to 
understand the reasons behind the decisions to modernize made by the kings, and the 
effects these modernizing changes had on the country.  It was these reforms that 
eventually created the impetus for political change and eventually a call for democratic 
reform. 
 I believe it is important to understand and evaluate the role of the kings in these 
historical changes.  It highlights the king in Thailand as the historic and traditional person 
guiding and initiating all change in society, due to the fact he has been the sole source of 
legitimacy.  The development of this role of the monarchy highlighted in this history is 
important in understanding why the current King assumes the role as the “leader” of 
democratic change, and also why it has been so difficult for him to hand over that power.  
Chapter 2: 
 This chapter outlines the critical events of 1973-76.  The revolution of 1973 was 
extremely important because it began the end of a continual military rule that had been in 
place since the revolution of 1932.  Also, it reflects the reemergence of the power and 
importance of the King in Thai society and politics at this point.  It also highlights the 
changes that had taken place in the Thai people and society as they staged their first 
protest in favor of actual democratic change. 
 The events of 1976, in particular, highlight the King’s role at this point in the very 
beginning of the democratic transition.  His role in supporting the coup, the military, and 
consequently the violence of 1976 is telling of his larger attitude towards the democratic 
transition.  His involvement in this situation sets the precedent that allows his continued 
actions in the future in times of “political crises,” actions often inconsistent with 
achieving full democracy. 
Chapter 3: 
 This chapter addresses the events of 1992.  As with 1973-76, there was a coup 
and a democratic protest by the people.  However, society and the people had evolved 
much further by this point in time, in terms of economic status, education and other areas, 
and the military had taken a decreasing role in politics.  Thus, events unfolded differently 
in 1992 than in 1973-76. 
 The role of the King was also different in this context.  He is seen in a more 
positive light as he stepped in against a military dictator that was threatening the progress 
of democracy.  However, I argue that again his actions were  not to further the progress 
of democracy, but to protect his interests in a manner consistent with his “conservative” 
mentality. 
Chapter 4: 
 This chapter addresses the final example of the King’s involvement and the effect 
it had on democratic growth.  The coup of 2006 was the most recent in Thai history and 
was very significant, because it deposed the first popularly elected prime minister  and 
abrogated the first “people’s constitution that had been in place since 1997.   
 The King is said to have stepped in and supported the coup that removed the 
“corrupt and authoritative” Thaksin (the sitting prime minister) from power.  His actions 
were considered by some as positive and necessary to save democracy.  But the point of 
this chapter is, once again, to show the King’s active role in politics and the debilitating 
effect it had on further democratic growth. 
Conclusion: 
 The conclusion of this thesis will evaluate the meaning of these events in more 
detail, paying special attention to the actions of the King, his motives, and the 
consequences of his actions.  These events will emphasize my counter argument to the 
commonly held beliefs I have outlined above.  I then return to Huntington’s theory of 
democratic transition through which I will ultimately evaluate the role of Thailand’s king 
in the democratic transition.  
 Under Huntington’s theory of democratization, the king of Thailand fills the 
traditional “role” but only up to a point.  Fundamentally, he has yet to relinquish his 
traditional source of legitimacy to democratic institutions and interfered with the 
democratic transition such that it has not been completed. 
Final Comment: Availability of sources 
 There is a final point to be made in regards to the research processes and 
availability of sources for the thesis I am advancing.  This point is that I have found 
there is a serious lack of information in the form of any kind of analysis regarding the 
subject of the current king of Thailand and the political situation.  The King is an 
extremely sensitive issue in Thai society today.  Authors David Morrell and Chai-anan 
Samudavanija explain this issue well in their book, Political Conflict in Thailand. “The 
unwillingness to speak or write of the monarchy in relation to political activity is due to 
the pejorative connotation…the king should not be touched by the vulgarity of the 
political situation.”8  In this understanding, the King is essentially above politics and so 
should not be discussed as such.  Reinforcing this belief is the current lese majeste law, 
which forbids anyone from speaking critically of the king or the institution of the 
monarch under threat of severe punishment, which is imprisonment of up to fifteen years.  
This law, one of the mainstays of continuing undemocratic traditions, is vaguely written.  
It gives the prosecutors a wide scope in what they consider to be “critical” writing.  
Kevin Hewison writes in his book, Political Change in Thailand, that “most Thai 
academics are unwilling to comment on the monarchy due to the lese majeste laws.”9  He 
also explains that while foreign academics would not be subject to these laws, there is 
still an incentive to employ self-censorship due to the issues of implicating fellow Thai 
scholars, fear of being banned from Thailand, and lack of willing publisher. 
 I have found this to be true in my research of the King.  In many of the articles 
and books I reviewed, especially regarding the three specific events outlined hereafter, 
descriptions of the actions on the part of the King are non-existent, brief, or especially 
non critical.  When I did come across a study that was done that offered more insight, it 
was the very topic of that article or book, placing the author’s objectivity and consequent 
accuracy in doubt to some degree.  Rarely did I find an article or book dedicated to some 
other topic that would offer any type of insight to the actions or motives of the King.  
Mostly, it was an all or nothing situation. 
 This being said, I am not surprised by this lack of information.  Having spent the 
summer in Thailand before I undertook the writing of this thesis, I came to understand 
                                                        
8 David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction and 
Revolution,(West Germany, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1981). p. 64 
9 Kevin Hewison, Political Change in Thailand, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 58 
 
first-hand the sensitivity of the subject of the King.  The NGO I worked with, the 
People’s Empowerment Foundation, repeatedly stressed to me the delicacy with which I 
had to treat this subject.  In my interviews with various political figures it became 
obvious that the King could be a subject of interest, but never in a critical or questioning 
manner.  The only revealing conversations I had about the King were behind closed doors 
at my work. 
 II. BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION - KINGS RAMA IV-VII (1850-1932). 
 An evaluation of the reigns of Kings Rama 4, 5, 6, and 7 provides important 
background for the circumstances and changes leading up to the Revolution of 1932 that 
marks the beginning of the democratization period in Thailand.  Each King was 
responsible for changing the nation in a certain way, and developing the role of the 
monarch, laying the foundation for democratic transition.   Up until Rama 4, Siam was an 
under-developed country and mostly cut off from the rest of the developed world.  The 
wave of colonization sweeping through Southeast Asia created the fear that Siam would 
also become colonized by imperial powers.  To avoid this, Rama 4 made the decision to 
modernize the country to maintain independence in the face of the threat of imperial 
invasion. 
Rama Four: Mongkut (1851-1868)  
 The “modern period” of Thailand really begins with Mongkut, King Rama 4.  
After serving as a monk for 27 years, he ascended to the throne in 1851.  At the age of 
47, he was well prepared to take the throne. As historian David Wyatt notes in his book, 
A Short History, Thailand, the King’s, the King’s “religious life had not been cloistered; 
indeed, he was better prepared for the throne by his monastic experience, having had the 
opportunity to study and read widely, as well as to travel through the country and speak 
with many people.”10 As he saw the neighboring countries fall under imperial power, he 
realized that something must be done to preserve the independence of Siam.  Western 
powers questioned Siam’s form of monarchy, claiming that it was archaic and outdated.  
                                                        
10 David K. Wyatt, A Short History, Thailand, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2003) p. 
167 
 
As noted expert Paul Handley writes in The King Never Smiles, “English newspapers in 
Bangkok and Singapore attacked him for his assumption of deity, and for amoral antics in 
his huge harem, and for the royal monopolies and corruption.  It was all proof, they said, 
of Siam’s need of colonization.”11  Responding to these threats, Mongkut made the 
decision to modernize the country and the monarchy.  He opened up Siam to international 
trade in 1855 with the British. 
 The parameters of this trade agreement changed much of Thailand’s economic 
system. These changes, especially the abolishment of monopolies, changed the basic way 
the palace and government operated, in that the princes and palace officials relied heavily 
on these monopolies for their livelihood.12  Not only did they have to find new sources of 
revenue, but also economic opportunity began to arise that existed independently from 
the palace and the patronage system.  
 In addition to the changes in the revenue system, a new openness towards 
westerners was created.  In order to cultivate good and diplomatic relations with western 
powers, Mongkut opened up the country and his court to western visitors. Mongkut put a 
new emphasis on western education, and invited western tutors into his home for the 
purpose of teaching his children.  Trading agreements similar to the original one with 
England were made with several other countries, including the United States and France.  
In doing this, Mongkut hoped to “avoid such suffocatingly close bilateral relationships as 
those between British India and Burma, or France and Vietnman.”13  Playing upon these 
                                                        
11 Paul Handley, The King Never Smiles, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2006). p. 31 
12 Wyatt, p. 168 
13 Wyatt, p. 168 
different imperial powers gave Siam the strength and protection it needed from 
colonization by any one particular nation.   
 However, despite these major changes, imperial powers were wary of the lack of 
modernization and changes in the government:  
“Though one might have expected major internal changes commensurate with the 
drastic shifts in foreign and fiscal policy, very little fundamental reform was 
undertaken during Mongkut’s reign…The administration did not change.  
Government was carried on in the homes of officials as it had been for centuries, 
and it was characterized by Europeans as corrupt, inefficient and inhuman.  
Justice remained highly personalized and heavily subject to the social and 
economic pressures that could be mobilized by the individuals involved.  The 
civil administration was seen to be riddled with nepotism, its officers 
remunerated largely by percentages of the business they transacted.”14 
 
 The imperial powers saw a corrupt government as a direct threat to their 
economic interests, and so the threat of colonization still loomed.  The British 
government imposed sanctions, such as “imitations of import and export duties and other 
taxation,” on their trading agreement to put pressure on Mongkut to reform his “corrupt” 
system of government.15  
 Responding to his critics, Mongkut enacted more reforms.  He saw the necessity 
for more modernization in response to these threats, but knew that these reforms must be 
enacted slowly and carefully so as not to incite a backlash from those that were used to 
the old system.  Most importantly, he could not infringe upon the patronage system that 
was central to his power, as well as other powerful families he relied on. 
 And so the reforms Mongkut enacted were cautious and slow in nature.  One of 
the first reforms was to increase transparency in the government to a degree.  He did this 
by creating a “publication of a government gazette” where he allowed the laws of the 
                                                        
14 Ibid 
15 Wyatt, p. 170 
kingdom to be printed. In addition he set up a system whereby his subjects could petition 
their grievances to him directly.  He did away with old “archaic” traditions surrounding 
the monarchy.  He allowed foreign advisers to become involved in his government.  “In 
addition, he attempted to make some social reforms by improving the condition for slaves 
and allowing women to have some say in their marriage choices.”16 
 It is likely that Mongkut had more reforms in mind, but in 1868 he became ill 
with Malaria and died.  He had been preparing his eldest son Chulalongkorn to come 
after him as King.  He had given him an education that was infused with both Thai and 
western elements, as well as an apprenticeship in politics so that he could learn the ways 
of governing.17 However, when Mongkut died, Chulalongkorn was only fifteen years old.  
He too had fallen ill with Malaria, and many suspected he would not recover.  When he 
did, he ascended the throne, but with Suriyawong as his regent.  The first part of 
Chulalongkorn’s reign as king would be overshadowed by the presence and power of 
Suriyawong.  
 Elements helping to lay the foundation of democratization occurred under 
Mongkut’s rule.  His decision to modernize was a direct result of the threat of 
colonization by foreign forces. To be sure, opening up Siam to the world saved the nation 
from colonization.  Imperial countries were able to pursue their economic interests 
without becoming directly involved in governing the country, and no one country had a 
larger influence than another due to the diversification of trade agreements.  Aside from 
these economic changes, which brought more wealth into the country, cultural changes 
took place as well.  Attitudes towards westerners became more open, and there was an 
                                                        
16 Ibid 
17 Id, p. 171 
increased encouragement and emphasis on western interaction and education.  Reforms in 
the government were less pronounced.  But the monarch did became “more human” and 
accessible to the public as well as to foreign visitors. The seeds of democracy were 
beginning to take root as a call for a change in the “corrupt” system of government 
currently in place began to arise, not just by foreign forces, but within the royal 
household as well.  While the changes enacted by Mongkut were well intentioned, and 
were not the most radical in nature, they set the monarchy, the Thai government and the 
rest of the country on a path of change that would not be stopped. 
Rama V: Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) 
 While Mongkut was seen as the more radical reformer of his day, most of his 
activities were in response to imperial threats, rather than acting of his on violation and 
motivation to change.  His reforms were eclipsed entirely by those enacted by Rama V, 
who is said to have brought the most change to the country of Siam in all of history 
during his 37-year reign.  Not only did he modernize the country even further, but he 
solidified more completely the power of the Monarch and its long lasting place in Thai 
society. 
 As mentioned early, he ascended the throne at the early age of fifteen.  He did not 
have the experience or the following of people to be politically important at this time.  In 
addition, his power was controlled and overshadowed by the regent, Suriyawong, who 
had a large and loyal following of older people in the court. The first period of 
Chulalongkorn’s reign was thus dictated by this struggle of power, spanning from his 
ascension in 1868 to 1883, the death of Suriyawong. 
 “It was only in 1873 that the character of the new ruler began to be evidenced 
publicly...Chulalongkorn began a series of reforms that displayed his modern sentiments 
and intentions.”18  He began to modernize the monarchy by “bringing his image closer to 
earth.19   He began to make more public appearances, and even allowed others to touch 
him.  In addition, he abolished the custom that required subjects to prostrate themselves 
before him. 
 As older members of the court began to die in the 1880’s, Chulalongkorn was 
able to fill their positions with western educated princes from his family that were loyal 
to him. With these princes, he created new branches of government that had “advisory, 
investigatory, and legislative powers” called the Privy Council and Council of State.20  
“Advised by his European counsels, he gave his government a modern bureaucratic 
shape.  Professional schools were established for the civil service.”21  In addition to these 
reforms, he issued royal decrees that centralized the budget, which created a separate 
budget for the palace, giving the royal family more power and financial freedom.  
First Mention of Democracy 
 The king and his brothers had effectively consolidated power for themselves.  But 
the increase in the size and functionality of the government created new problems for the 
King.  And “providing modern educations to a new generation of Chakris and then to 
non-royal service officials opened the door to new political ideas.22  A group of young 
radicals began to question the King’s ability to effectively and govern and control a 
                                                        
18 Wyatt, p. 173 
19 Handley, p. 33 
20 Wyatt, p. 173 
21 Handley, p. 35 
22 Ibid 
rapidly changing and growing government and nation.  “In a strongly worded sixty-page 
petition addressed to the King early in 1885, eleven young men strongly urged that the 
king quickly move toward a system of parliamentary democracy under a constitutional 
monarchy.”23 
 The King responded by stating that Siam was simply not ready for such a style of 
government.  He agreed with “their perception of a necessary connection between 
domestic reforms and the maintenance of national independence,” but he emphasized the 
need for educated men to carry out such an endeavor, of which he saw there to be a 
shortage at the moment.24  He stated that “to introduce electoral and parliamentary 
politics would weaken the state when it was most in need of unity and direction.”25  He 
recognized the need for reform, but looking at his country, where “the bulk of agricultural 
population had little political independence of mind,” and those with “any exposure to 
modern education” only numbering in the few hundreds, the implementation of a true 
representative democracy did not seem possible.26 
 The King took action in response to this petition by sending Prince Devawongse 
“to study and report on the organization of European governments.”27  The prince 
recommended “the formation of a cabinet of twelve equal ministries including the heads 
of the seven old ministries and five new ones, the responsibilities of each to be newly 
defined on functional lines… new ministries were to be created for public works, public 
instruction, justice, army and privy seal.”28  This was the creation of the first real 
                                                        
23 Wyatt, P. 185 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Id. p. 186 
systematic bureaucracy that was set up to carrying out the King’s bidding.  The ministers 
began to form real traditions.  They met regularly, recorded their meetings, and shared 
information and advice more freely.  The national agenda finally began to become 
cohesive - people were working together in a procedural manner with oversight and 
direction coming from the King, rather than as individuals pursing tasks out of self 
interest without consultation.  
Results of reforms 
 The main problem with the reforms was the haste in which they were attempted .  
“There was not time to proceed cautiously and deliberately with reform.  Western 
demands for facilities and security had to be met quickly...because Siam’s modernization 
had been so long delayed by political difficulties, the agenda of reform had been allowed 
to pile up while the means of dealing with it had not yet been developed.”29  The reforms 
were necessary, but resources such as money, institutions and qualified people, were not 
quite ready to deal or implement them properly. 
 This problem worried the King - “he often despaired at the compromise that had 
to be made, the work left undone, and the imperfections in the system that was being 
developed.”30  He was concerned that perhaps the European system of governance and 
ways of life were simply incompatible with the Thai values and people, and would never 
be able to be properly implemented. After a trip to Europe, he realized that while the 
compromises being made in the reforms process meant that development in Siam fell 
short of the “European definition of modernity,” they still were still necessary and 
possessed utility in that they “allowed the perpetuation of the best values of Siam’s 
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civilization within a borrowed structure.”31  The importance of Siam retaining its national 
and cultural identity while borrowing aspects of governance from European nation would 
come to dominate future debates surrounding democracy. 
Death of Chulalongkorn 
 Chulalongkorn died in 1910.  Many changes had taken place during his forty-two 
year reign.  “If by 1910 Siam was not yet a modern nation, then at least it was a 
modernizing nation, and securely so.  In the face of foreign threats and not a little 
domestic opposition, Chulalongkorn had created a new structure for the state that 
possessed a dynamic of its own, an orientation toward change.”32   
 His reforms in regards to the composition and tradition of the government were 
sweeping.  He created a bureaucracy with the main purpose to bring about change to 
reach western standards.  He did this by recruiting men that had been exposed to western 
education and therefore had western expectations.  With this new goal in mind, he 
changed the function and composition of the bureaucracy.  His increased control over the 
government allowed him to make these changes, and with these changes “the old order 
simply withered away.”33  “By breaking the old social hierarchy and creating a new one,” 
he was able to reestablish royal authority over the government in a way that had never 
been harnessed before.”34 He was able to stage “a revolution from above in his program 
of modernization.”35   
 The effects of modernization were being felt through out the country.  Politically, 
as a result of these changes, the first call for democratization began under Chulalongkorn, 
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and would not die down until the Revolution in 1932.  Unlike many other democracies, 
the cal for liberalization and democracy was coming from the top down at its inception in 
Siam. 
RAMA 6: King Vajiravuduh (1910-1925) 
 Vajiravuduh became king in 1910.  His reign was much different than those of 
Rama 4 and Rama 5.  He inherited a completely different country and so faced different 
challenges.  Foreign threat had all but abated and the country was well on it way to 
modernization, although unevenly.  His reign was shaped by the rising nationalist 
sentiment that sweeping the world at that time. 
 Despite all of his years of preparation, “Vajiravuduh was not widely known or 
popular nor did he have extensive networks of supporters and clients prior to coming to 
the throne.”36  This being the case, he decided to expand his power through the military, 
which previously had not been very prominent, by creating two new military 
organizations.  “The first was a new unit under the palace royal guard and  “the second 
was something completely new, the so-called Wild Tiger Corps, a nationwide 
paramilitary corps.”37   
 One of his biggest contributions was the creation of Thai nation and Thai identity.  
Looking to countries such as Japan, England and Germany, “He endeavored to imbue 
Siam with the same unified, disciplined patriotic drive and sense of national duty that 
those countries enjoyed.38  He believed that the nation should provide a form of identity 
for its people, and that these people should share a common interest:   
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“He envisioned structuring behavior and values primarily in terms of achieving 
the nation’s goal: people should act in their personal lives in ways conducive to 
the nation’s interest.  In addition to logical concerns for national defense and the 
achievement of international equality, he espoused ideas of economic 
nationalism- freeing the economy from foreign control.”39 
 
 When it came to constructing Thai identity, “His formula was to direct his 
people’s loyalty not toward the geopolitical or cultural state, but on the body of the king 
himself.”40  Thus, he founded the Thai nation and consequently Thai identity on the idea 
of the “nation-religion-monarch, an entity in which all three elements were inextricably 
bound together. Allegiance to any one of the three meant loyalty to all three; disloyalty or 
disobedience or disrespect toward one meant disrespect toward all.”41  The role of this 
three-headed ideology in helping, or hindering democratization at different times is a 
subject explored in this paper. 
  The King’s contributions to the modernization process were mostly social 
reforms.  He put an emphasis on expanding the culture of art, literature and the theatre, 
not just for the royal elite, but for the whole public. He began many clubs, such as the 
Enhancement of Knowledge Club, to promote and produce magazines and theatricals 
which “espoused modern valued and patterns of behavior.”42  He also made changes in 
regards to women and education.  He advocated for monogamy and that women should 
have a choice in their marriage.  He also advocated for widespread modern education.  
He made primary education compulsory by law for all boys and girls between the ages of 
seven and fourteen.  He created the first university in Bangkok, Chulalongkorn 
University, as a memorial to his father. 
                                                        
39 Wyatt, p. 216 
40 Handley, p. 31 
41
 Wyatt, p. 216 
42
 Id. P. 217 
Problems during his reign 
 Despite the many positive changes Vijiravuduh made during his reign, it was also 
rife with complications and controversies.  The most important is the first instance of a 
potential coup.  The creation of the Wild Tiger Corps led to the first organized coup 
attempt against the monarch.  A plot was made between twenty-two young lieutenants in 
the army, who felt personally disrespected by the creation of the Wild Tiger Corps and 
the consequent downgrading of the army.  These junior military officers decided to stage 
a coup against the absolute monarchy on the grounds that “they considered Siam to be 
backward, unjust, corrupt, and even morally debased.  They had come to blame their 
country’s ills on the existing system of government.”43  Although the plot was discovered 
and arrests quickly made, it was the first direct challenge to the authority of the King to 
take place in Siam.  It was the first time anyone openly cited the King and his 
government as the impediment to Siam’s goal of modernization. 
 In regards to the institution of the monarch, there were additional criticisms made.  
“Vajiravudh apparently devoted little thought or attention to political changes.  He 
rejected all calls for political reform as selfishly motivated, disloyal and certain to bring 
ruin to Siam.”44 Critics pointed out the contradiction that the King would support 
modernization and development in all other areas of life, but not when it came to the 
government.  
Death of Vajiravudh- 1925 
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 Vajiravudh died at age forty-four in 1925 having produced no sons to inherit the 
throne.  Before his passing he named Prince Prajadhipok, Chulalongkorn’s youngest son, 
to be his successor. 
 Although Vajiravudh’s  reign was fraught with complication and controversy, 
some positive change did take place.  He reduced “the preeminence of the princes, his 
brother and uncles,” by “promoting many commoners to higher positions in the still-
expanding government.”45  By doing this he was able to make the government seem more 
democratic and professional, because it gave the impression that he was sharing power.  
This was also important because it protected and encouraged the meritocratic system 
which Chulalongkorn had introduced earlier as means of selecting individuals to serve as 
officials in the government, thereby changing at least some aspects of the old patronage 
system, giving power to a new set of people. 
 In addition, his creation of “nation-religion-king” paradigm provided the Thai 
people with a cohesive identity they did not previously have.- expand on this p. 39 
handley 
 Perhaps he most important aspect of Vajiravudh’s reign in regard to 
democratization is the first occasion of political tensions.  This was present in the 
“attempted coup” by the young officers, who directed their anger towards the monarch as 
the source of the country’s problems.  In addition there was the elite’s general 
dissatisfaction with the lack of modernization of political institutions such as the 
monarch, as well as their criticism of the monarch’s accumulation of too much power.  
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They believed that “it was logically impossible for him and his indefinitely to promote 
change in everything but political institutions.”46 
The Last Absolute Monarch- Prajadhipok (1925-1933) 
 Prajadhipok was not prepared  for his reign as King.  He had been educated in 
England expecting to have a career in the army.  His rise to the throne was the result of 
several unexpected deaths of his older brothers.  He lacked governmental experience, and 
so was vulnerable to the opinions and positions of his older half-brothers and uncles who 
had more experience in politics. 
 Prajadhipok inherited a country and government that had many problems - the 
most crippling one being its financial condition.  This caused much strain and turmoil 
within the government as they sought to find a solution. “This governmental inefficiency 
and semiparalysis…led a substantial segment of the urban elite...to lose, to some 
immeasurable extent, faith in government, and at least to begin to question, if not to 
challenge, the fundamental tenets of their social and political system based on the 
absolute monarchy.”47 
 In combination with this dissatisfaction by the people was a new way to voice 
such a sentiment.  The creation of daily newspapers and weekly magazine allowed for the 
publication and proliferation of this widespread discontent on a scale that had never 
existed before. This widespread and heavily publicized criticism of the government left 
the institution of the monarch more vulnerable than it had ever been.   
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 Therefore Prajadhipok’s task was to “restore confidence in the monarchy and 
government.”48  He did this by creating the Supreme Council of State, a “super-cabinet 
compromising the top-ranked and most experienced members of the royal family.”49   
This council was created with the purpose of helping the inexperienced king deal with the 
serious financial crises.  Also, it brought power back into the control of the royal family.
 For the time being the situation began to improve for Prajadhipok.  The economy 
was doing better, and so the financial pressure was temporarily suspended.  But despite 
this turnaround, danger still existed. Prajadhipok “knew many Bangkokians resented 
royal privilege and monopoly on high positions, and he knew of the Thai students in 
Europe who openly discussed alternatives like parliamentary democracy, national 
socialism and communism.”50 
 To deal with this issue of political development, he sought the advice of Francis 
B. Sayre in a memorandum headed “Problems of Siam.”  In this memorandum he asked 
many questions regarding the inevitability of parliamentary democracy in Thailand and if 
“anglo-saxon”  parliamentary government was really suitable for eastern people. For the 
most part the King was open to change, but expressed some reservations over the 
“readiness” of Thailand for representative democracy. In a memorandum titled 
“Democracy in Siam” he stated the following; 
“if it is admitted that some day we may be forced to have some form of 
democracy in Siam, we must prepare ourselves for it gradually.  We must learn 
and we must educated ourselves.  We must learn and experiment as to have an 
idea as to how a parliamentary government would work in Siam…If we are to 
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have a parliament, we must teach the people how to vote and how to elect 
representatives who really have their interests at heart,”51 
 
 To follow this goal, Prajadhipok introduced an advisory Committee of the Privy 
Council, as well as several experiments in municipal self-government. The Privy Council 
was similar to the legislative councils enacted during previous reigns.  But this council 
worked ineffectively and was more for show than function.  Members of the Supreme 
Council argued “it put the monarchy in a bad light because it would propose things to the 
throne, rather than only respond to royal requests.”52  In addition, Prajahidpok proposed a 
prime minister to supervise the Supreme Council of State.  This suggestion was met with 
so much opposition that it was never created.  Similar criticisms were made- one prince 
argued “it would dangerously suggest to the people that the king no longer rule the 
country.”53 
  The world wide depression of the early 1930’s created economic problems for 
Thailand like everyone else, leading once again to public dissatisfaction. Criticism and 
doubts of the government’s ability to govern efficiently were raised once again.  
Receiving pressure form the royal family and members of the upper class, the King 
passed policies that forced the middle class and the peasantry to bear the brunt of the 
economic crises.  
 In the face of massive popular discontent and the threat of rebellion, the King 
made the choice to enact some sort political reform in the direction of representative 
democracy. He assigned the task to his foreign minister, Prince Devawong.  With the 
help of his American adviser Raymond Stevens, they drafted a new constitution.  In the 
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draft, the reforms introduced an appointed prime minister that would be given the 
executive functions of the King, and would “preside over a cabinet responsible to a 
legislative assembly, the membership of which would be half elected, and half 
appointed.54  The King would still have the right to veto laws and policies, as well as 
choose the prime minister. This draft was rejected by all of the princes and was not 
adopted 
The final fall -the coup of 1932 
 In the aftermath of the princes’ rejection of the constitution, they “again 
overhauled the king’s economic reforms and further insulted themselves from new taxes, 
while passing the burden to the middle class.”55  This appeared to be the final straw.  A 
coup was staged by a group of “middle-level officials” consisting of new bourgeois elite, 
well-educated civil servants and army officers.  They numbered only around one 
hundred.  They rounded up chief officials and sent a message to the King, who was 
vacationing at Hua Hin, that he must agree to submit to a constitution.  “The princes were 
seized without violence, and the revolution was over in lass than 24 hours.”56  The King, 
who had foreseen such an event, agreed to submit. 
Aftermath of Revolution 
 The aftermath of the revolution was a dark time for the throne.  With the throne 
essentially stripped of all its powers, and facing a rising anti-royalist sentiment from the 
bureaucratic elite and the populace at large, King Prajadhipok and the royal went into 
exile in 1934.  The king struggled unsuccessfully with the military to come back to 
Thailand with the assurance he would regain some of his power.  In 1935, when this did 
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not happen, he abdicated the throne in favor of his successor, Ananda, who was then only 
a boy and living abroad in Switzerland.  Prince Ananda and his family, including Prince 
Bhumibol, his brother would become the king, did not return to Thailand until 1946.  
Thus marked a period of time in Thai history that is unusual in that it was “dominated not 
by a king but rather by a handful of the promoters of the 1932 coup.”57  
King Bhumibol 
 The purpose of this paper is not to summarize the events of King Bhumibol’s 
reign, only to evaluate his actions in regards to the democratic transition.  However, here 
I will provide a brief summary of how he came to power, the first part of his reign, and 
important aspects of his reign that are relevant to the democratic process. 
 King Bhumibol, or Rama IX, is the longest reigning monarch in the world.  He 
came ascended the throne in 1946, and has been there ever since.  He is the monarch that 
is the content of this paper.  Eevery reference to “the king” hereafter, unless specified 
otherwise, is in reference to Bhumibol. 
 Rama IX came to the throne in interesting circumstances.  Being the second 
eldest, he was not raised to be king.  His brother Ananda was the first in line.  However, 
Ananda was found dead in room in 1947.  His death has never been explained.  It was in 
this situation that Bhumibol, only 18 at the time, came to the throne. 
 Author Richard Hewison writes in his book “Political Change in Thailand,” that 
when Bhumibol came to the throne he “inherited a position which had little political 
power or influence.”58  This is the result of the situation that occurred leading up to and in 
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the aftermath of the revolution of 1932 as mentioned earlier- the rise of the military and 
anti-royalist sentiment.   
 This situation overshadowed the first part of Bhumibol’s reign.  During the period 
of 1946-1957, which was dominated by General Phibun who was staunchly anti-royalist, 
the king was rarely involved in politics.  “It was only after General Sarit’s twin coups of 
1957-58, overthrowing the constitution and parliament and establishing highly 
authoritarian regimes, that the monarchy’s positions was revived and the present king 
given a higher profile.  His interest in politics was encouraged by Sarit.”59   
Bhumibol and the military, and conservatism 
 There are two main themes that dominated Bhumibol’s reign; his relationship 
with the military and his conservative mentality.  These two aspects are important to 
understanding his actions in the subsequent chapters. 
 As demonstrated above, the king owes the resurrection of the monarchy to Sarit.  
It was this act that began the long lasting relationship between the military and the king.  
The immergence and importance is summarized by David Morrell and Chai-anan 
Samudavanija in their book “Political Conflict in Thailand: 
“Especially after Field Marshal Sarit seized power in 1957, a definite relationship emerged 
between the military elite that rule Thailand and the royalty that reigned over it.  Each needed the 
other for continue pursuit of its own objectives.  Neither fully trusted the other, but each had by 
necessity found ways to accommodate the other’s fundamental requirements.  Most directly, the 
military’s continued control over the political process- as exemplified in its periodic seizures of 
power- could not succeed without explicit or implicit support from the palace.  At the same time, 
the palace has depended increasingly on the military as the guardian of national security and the 
continuity of the throne itself.  Military leaders adeptly turned any opposition to the regime into 
opposition to the royal institution.”60 
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This give and take relationship has remained for the entirety of Bhumibol’s reign.  
Although the military has declined in direct political power since these years, their role of 
“protecting the national interest and continuity of the throne itself” explains their 
continued presence in Thai politics in that the king necessitates their assistance.  His 
actions in the subsequent chapters will be analyzed according to this relationship. 
 The second theme of Bhumibol’s reign is his conservatism. Once the power of the 
throne had been restored, many believed that Bhumibol would be committed to the cause 
of change as his predecessors had.  “Darling believed that the King would be a liberal and 
democratic monarchy, with an interest in preserving freedom; however, this optimism 
was misplaced..the present King’s legacy has been to define a conservative monarchy, 
supporting stability and order, authority and tradition, developmentalism, unity and 
solidarity, national chauvinism, and national security and anti-communism.  Because of 
its conservatism, this monarchy has not indicated any fundamental commitment to 
democratic reform.”61 
 Hewison outlines the king’s conservative mentality.  He states that his 
conservatism embodies many beliefs and ideologies in relation to Thailand.  First is his 
interest in the preservation of values and traditions that are central to society.  The king 
believes that these values are upheld in the traditional institutions of Thailand, such as the 
monarchy.  Therefore there is no need for radical change of these institutions.  Radical 
change of these institutions could be detrimental to society because it would mean the 
destruction of these important values. 
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 Secondly, Hewison states that the king emphasizes unity and discipline.  “Such 
themes have remained constant in King Bhumibol’s speeches.”62  The king stresses these 
qualities because he sees them as essential to being an “advanced and well-off country.  
The king believes that “unity prevents trouble, and where unity does not exists, 
subversion and crime will be the result.”63 
  Hewison states that the king closely ties discipline and unity with law and order 
and authority.  He highlights that these two are constant themes in the king’s speeches 
over the years.  The king believes that without law and order, society would “degenerate 
and become confused and unstable, and possibly collapse altogether.”64 
 Hewison states that this conservative mentality embodied by the king predisposes 
him to authoritarianism.  The king had a public dislike for politics, calling it a “filthy 
business.”  He also had a strong dislike for party politics, which is saw as “setting people 
against each other rather than uniting them.”65  His mixed view of parliamentary politics 
has led him to advocate not for western style democracy, but for a democracy that fits the 
values and traditions of the Thai people.  In a speech the king states: 
“Thais..need not follow any king of foreign democracy and should try instead to create our own 
Thai style of democracy, for we have our own national culture and outlooks and we are capable 
of following our own reasoning.”66 
 This conservative mentality, which is for the preservation of “traditional values” 
and all institutions that embody them, as well as a preference for order, stability and unity 
over anything else, guided the king’s actions in the subsequent chapters. 
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 IV. 1973-1976: THE REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH. 
 Many forces gave rise to the “Revolution of 1973” and the events that took place 
in the immediate following years.  Two of the most important causes of the revolution 
were the rapidly growing population and the change in its composition, especially the rise 
of an educated and liberal-minded class of students.  
  “Economic and social change in Thailand have been rapid in recent years, 
altering the very fabric of society.  This has been overwhelmingly evident in urban areas, 
especially Bangkok…By the 1970’s the gap between some changes and the stagnant, 
traditional political system had become apparent.”67  In fact, the Thai population had 
grown rapidly from 26 million in 1960 to 34 million in 1970.68  This explosive growth 
placed a strain on land and resources, and the government was slow to deal with the 
rising tensions. 
 These population changes were mostly a result of economic growth and the 
change in the makeup of the economy.  In the 1970’s the government shifted its policy 
“toward the export-oriented industry away from the agricultural industry, although 
agriculture still played a relevant and important part.”69  The shift in the economy led to 
opportunities for people that did not previously exist, primarily in urban and suburban 
areas. 
 The growth and change in the composition of the population, in turn, led to new 
expectations by people in society.  More and more, they began to demand new jobs, 
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services, and land - resources that were not readily available.  Thailand overall had not 
adapted to all these changes taking place in society, and the government began to come 
under attack as the increasing subject of blame. 
   Leading this new wave of change were the students.  Education had become 
more widespread in Thailand and was available to a much larger segment of the 
population by the 1970s. This growth in education was seen as a positive change for 
Thailand, but along with it came new pressures and issues in society as well.   
“Government employment was not expanding as rapidly as the numbers of the 
university graduates, and for the first time large numbers of young middle class 
aspiring middle class thais had to consider entering careers in the private sector.  
There they found themselves more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and to 
judgment on the basis of their performance then they traditionally did in the civil 
service.  They felt relatively less secure and perhaps less certain of their social 
standing.”70 
 
This lack of availability of jobs for newly-educated students was attributed as a failure of 
the government to respond to the needs of a changing society.  Also, there was a new 
awareness and desire for a government that could adjust to and represent the people’s 
needs.   
1968- 1973 An attempt at a Constitution 
 There had been pressure for a new constitution for many years.  The military 
rulers in place had not produced one since the take over in 1958. The pressure to do so 
came from many places.  First, there was international pressure from the US.  “The 
American press portrayed Thailand, after two decades and a billion dollars of U.S. aid, as 
led by corrupt, inept and dictatorial generals.”71  There was fear of the US withdrawing 
its support in the event a constitution could not be adopted. 
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 Upon returning from his tour of the United States in 1967, the King was also 
concerned that a new constitution should be created.  He experienced the international 
pressure first hand, and was concerned for the stability and safety of his country in the 
event that the US should withdraw their support.72  This external pressure was coupled 
with growing internal social pressure, expressed through dissatisfaction by the students 
and an emerging middle class.  They were tired of military rule and wanted the type of 
representative democracy they had read about and that had been promised to them. 
 In 1968, Prime Minister Thanom proposed a new constitution very similar to the 
one originally adopted in 1932. It created a bicameral parliament, with the lower house 
comprising of elected officials and the upper house containing officials appointed by the 
King.  But this new constitution did not last long and it did not satisfy the public’s 
demands.  “Although it was democratic on the surface, in its details the constitution 
essentially legitimized Thanom’s military-dominated government.”73  Thanom’s party 
won sweeping victories in the lower house, giving him full control of parliament. Despite 
all the societal changes that had taken place, “the new regime was unchanged.”74 
  In addition, whatever its form, the new government did not work effectively.  
The lower house had trouble getting a budget passed in a time when the country was 
dealing with serious financial issues.  People again questioned the government’s ability to 
rule the country and to address the pressing issues.  Student protests began to take place 
with regularity, bringing media attention to the issue, which attracted international 
attention once again.  The United States representatives in their statements began to cast 
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doubt on the nation’s stability.  The rise of an insurgency in the countryside also 
threatened national security and fueled calls for military action. Feeling his control 
beginning to slip and the political situation on the brink of chaos, Thanom then staged a 
coup against his own government in 1971.  “The 1971 coup abolished the constitution, 
parliament, and political parties, while the armed forces divided into several competing 
factions.”75 
 This self-imposed coup led to the downfall of Thanom.  In the past, a “strong man 
approach to political crises” might have worked; but now, “society as a whole...no longer 
seemed willing to accept a regime that appeared to represent only military interests in the 
guise of national security and the public welfare.”76 In addition, the military was not as 
cohesive and united as it once was.  Many in the armed forces did not support the self-
imposed coup and were unsatisfied with the result. 
 The biggest reaction, of course, came from the students who felt betrayed by this 
act:  “They had been led to expect political evolution, and their hopes were dashed by 
Thanom’s re-imposition of military rule.”77  In addition, due to the King’s initial support 
of a new constitution in 1969, the students felt they had royal consent in regards to their 
protest.  They defined their fight for democracy as defending the ideology of “the nation, 
religion, king.” 
 Events came to a headon October 6,1973, when students were arrested for 
distributing leaflets that called for the creation of a new constitution.  In response, 
“massive demonstration involving between 200,000 and 500,000 persons, including 
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university students, secondary and technical school students, and many young members 
of the middle class, demanded the release of the critics and the promulgation of the 
constitution.”78  The detainees were given the option of being released on bail, which 
they rejected.  Continued demands were made for a constitution.  In an article written by 
David Morrell titled “Political Conflict in Thailand,” the events are outlined:  
“The number of protestors in Bangkok and other major cities swelled to nearly 
100,000 as the atmosphere of tension and fear turned to violence.  Antiriot police 
and soldiers turned on protestors, first with tear gas and within a matter of hours, 
with hand grenades and rifles.. By October 14th..nearly a hundred demonstrators 
were dead, and many hundreds had been injured.”79 
 
The King denounced these acts of violence and “military heads refused to send their 
troops against civilian mobs” (Wyatt, p. 288).  Left without the support of the King or 
parts of the military, Thanom and his counterpart Praphas were forced to resign, and  flee 
the country in exile. 
Aftermath of the Revolution   
 The revolution of 1973 seemed to be a joyous occasion for Thailand.  As David 
Morell writes,” “There was great pride of accomplishment among those who had 
participated in the events of October.  Unarmed, they had overthrown the army with all 
its weapons and tanks…The belief that the king, though innately conservative, had 
intervened on behalf of his people and against the military gave rise to the further 
expectation that he would continue to support the forces of reform and social justice.”80  
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Although they did not bring an end to the military’s role in politics, there was at least “a 
new consciousness of the necessity of sharing political power.”81 
 In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 revolution, the students were considered 
heroic for the part they played in seemingly bringing an end to authoritarian rule and 
reinstating a democratic government.  They had the support of most of the people, 
although the students’ views and hopes were certainly more extreme than most.  In 
addition, the students were believed to have the blessing and support of the King. Many 
Thais saw the possibility of a unified, peaceful nation moving towards a democratic 
future.  However, problems were soon to develop that would cut this “democratic 
experiment” short.  
 Certain changes took place in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 revolution.  
First there was the creation of a new government and constitution. “The initial outcome 
was a civilian government under Prime Minister, Dr. Sanya Dharmaskati…A constitution 
calling for a unicameral, fully elected parliament was promulgated, and elections were 
scheduled for 1975.”82 
 A second important change took place in society itself.  There was a rise in new 
and more outspoken political organizations and activities formed not just by students, but 
peasants, farmers and workers.  The democratic reforms invited a new feeling of 
freedom, and invited people to voice more openly criticisms of the previous government 
and what expectations they had from the new government.  “Suddenly, demonstrations 
were not only permitted but pervasive.  Every day, it seemed there was a new 
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demonstration against something; and strikes too, where before than had not been labor 
unions.”83  
 On the surface these were good changes.  The government was shifting away 
from its authoritarian traditions.  People were becoming more involved in the political 
process - an essential component of democracy. However, in reality these political 
changes did not prove easy to implement:    
 “The participant institutions created after the October 1973 were the 
strongest that Thailand had seen to date; but they were vastly inadequate 
to the tasks required.  Formal structures established in the new constitution 
were quite democratic…However, it took the system so long to 
promulgate its new procedures (fifteen months from the uprising to the 
January 1975 election) that many activists were already disillusioned.”84   
 
In addition, the rise of social activism was causing anxiety among members of the 
conservative elite as well as in the monarchy. 
Problems begin to Arise  
 The fragility and inefficiency of the political system began to show with the 1975 
elections.  The rise of new political organizations and an increase in the amount of parties 
led to serious fragmentation.  “Forty-two political parties had been formed, espousing 
unclear and overlapping platforms.”85  This “confusion and complexity was far more than 
the voters could comprehend.”86  As a result, no party won a clear majority. Kukurit 
Pramoj, leader of the moderate Social Action party, formed a shaky coalition 
government.  The instability of the new government just two years after the revolution 
led many to begin to doubt the democratic reforms, and others to withdraw their support. 
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 A second problem involved changes in the student movement. The movement was 
mainly responsible for the overthrow in 1973 and many had supported the students in 
their efforts.  However, after 1973, the student movements began to become radicalized 
and fragmented and much more aggressive in the pursuit of their goals.  “Before a week 
had passed, student groups were factionalized, fragmented, and out of control due to 
personal rivalries, petty jealousies and lack of agreement on what to do with their new-
found power.”87 In addition, their focus was becoming scattered, with many student 
leaders breaking off from the main movement sending their own teams to “the most 
remote, poverty-stricken rural part of the country, while other students, in their group 
concentrated their efforts on slum dwellers in the capital.”88 
 This change in the student movement combined with the rise in political activists 
and creation of labor organizations ultimately constituted the rise of the  “leftist” 
movement in Thailand.  It came at a time when fear of communism was high in the 
world.  Long allied with the United States, Thailand historically was staunchly anti-
communist. As a result, many began to characterize the actions of the students and other 
leftist activists as communist, and therefore a threat to national security and the 
conservative tradition of the nation, embodied in the “nation, religion and king.” “The 
monarchy, the urban elite, and much of the middle class had become frightened by the 
radicalism of the students, whom they viewed as either communist directed of inspired.  
Their support soon swung to a variety of new organization of the right wing, most of 
which had backing in the military and bureaucracy.”89  The loss of the support of these 
                                                        
87 Morell, p. 162 
88 Morell and Samudavanjiji, p. 150 
89 Wyatt, p. 192 
segments of society  of people was a huge blow to the “leftist movement.”   Rightist 
organizations that were created in reaction to the leftist movements now began to gain 
momentum and power. 
Mobilization of the right: 
Things began to back away from the promise of real democracy: 
“By mid-1975, the forces of the right had recovered quite well.  They still had 
plenty of money and bureaucratic power. ..Threatened by the new forces of 
change, the right and the so-called silent majority began to strike back at the left, 
and especially at the students.  A variety of new rightist organization emerged, 
principal among them the Red Gaurs, Nawaphon, and the Village Scouts..such 
mobilization on the right..led quickly to a sharp polization in society at large.”90 
  
These rightist organizations mobilized on a scale never seen before.91  They cleverly 
connected their organizations with the ideology of “nation, religion, king,” and so while 
these organizations were mostly agents of elite power, by using this mantra they attracted 
Thai citizens from every social standing.  With this “ideology” they were able to 
“convince many Thais that the student-farmer-labor movement was indeed dedicated to 
destruction of the institutions and values they held dear.”92  
 Thus, rather then a society moving together towards democracy, there was 
developing polarization of the left and right, sowing instability and fear. This situation 
was exacerbated the already struggling government.  “By 1976, political 
assassinations…were commonplace.  Police harassed the electioneering of leftist parties, 
and even active moderates were afraid for their safety.  Violence, vituperation and 
incivility were now part of public life as they never had been before in Thailand.”93   
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 In just three years, the popular opinion of the student movement, once heralded as 
bringing democracy to the country, had completely turned around.  They were now 
perceived as enemies in many quarters and received the lion’s share of the blame for the 
current state of chaos.  A magazine at the time reported the Buddhist extremist 
Kittiwutho as stating: “such a killing is not killing persons because whoever destroys the 
nation, religion or the monarchy, such bestial types are not complete persons.  Thus, we 
must intend not to kill people but to kill the devil; this the duty of all Thai.”94  By 1976, 
the attitude of many people was one bordering panic and a desire to go to great lengths to 
rectify the situation. 
Coup of 1976 
 The government was simply too unstable and ill equipped to deal with all the 
issues at hand. “Polarization of the leftist and rights movements resulted in frequent and 
random violence.  “People in Bangkok were afraid.  They recalled the haunting refrain 
that a nation with problems cannot afford democracy.  No, they did not want Praphas and 
Thanom back; but yes, the present unstable situation was unacceptable.”95 
 The catalyst leading up to the student protests at Thammasat University was the 
re-entry of the previously exiled Thanom and Praphas.  Praphas returned under the 
premise that he needed specific medical attention, while Thanom returned to live his life 
as a Buddhist monk.  Both of these returns were supported and welcomed by the right 
wing and were given military protection.  The royal family also approved of their return, 
even visiting Thanom at his monastery .  Of course, their return caused great turmoil in 
Bangkok.  “The university students were outraged at this reception of one held 
                                                        
94 Morell and Samudavanija, p. 247 
95 Morell, p. 164 
responsible for the violence of 1973, and daily demonstrations began, especially at 
Thammasat University.”96   
 The right wing was quick to respond, bringing attention to the protests and 
mobilizing “true patriots” against the “communist” students that were trying to bring ruin 
to the country.  The sentiment expressed by the extremist monk embodied their mission, 
which was that violence was acceptable when it was against one who was an enemy of 
the country.  The final straw was when the students, in one of their protests, staged a 
mock hanging.  An ultra rightist newspaper published a photograph of the events, 
claiming the person being hung was meant to represent the Crown Prince Vairalongkorn.  
The students were then accused of “lese majeste” and declared enemies of the crown, 
making them enemies of the nation.  In the aftermath of this event,  “Massive assaults 
were launched against Thammasat University, in which Village Scouts, Red Gaurs, the 
police and other engaged in an orgy of violence.  Students were lynched, burned alive, 
and beaten..”97  “Female students were raped, alive and dead, by police and Red 
Gaurs.”98 After several hours the violence finally abated.  At this point the previous 
“democratic” government was dissolved.  In its place, a military junta was installed, with 
royal endorsement, calling themselves, the “National Administrative Reform Council.”99 
 The rationale for the 1976 coup was that it would restore peace and order.  The 
military, supported by the monarchy and other rightist groups, felt that “the public at 
large, dissatisfied with the results of an open political system since October 1973, might 
be willing to forgive and quickly forget - if domestic stability appeared a likely reward 
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for the sacrifice of representation, and if a coup could restore stability without 
violence.”100  The violence horrified many, but was seen as necessary and justified by the 
ruling order to save the nation from “the communist threat.” Furthermore, “the generals 
who seized power declared...the takeover of power…is aimed at safeguarding the 
institution of the monarchy.  The king and the royal family are being protected.”101 And 
so the democratic experiment that began in 1973 with great promise --but no sufficient 
foundation or infrastructure --came to a violent end just three years later. 
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V. THE COUP OF 1992 AND ITS AFTERMATH. 
 While the coup of 1991 and later events bear some similarities to the 1973-1976 
period, in most ways they are very different due to developments that took place in the 
post-1978 era.  The constitution put in place in 1978 lasted until the coup of 1991.  A new 
political awareness had taken hold in the people. 
 According to the scholar Sukhumbhand Paribatra in his article, “State Society in 
Thailand: How Fragile the Democracy?,” what took place in the post-1978 era was 
“liberalization without democracy:”   
A mixed system with significant liberal characteristics, including relatively high 
degrees of political and personal freedom, but without substance of Western-style 
democracy, It was a system where society became more equal to, but was still a 
large extent dominated by the state and those in control of the state apparatus.”102 
  
Paribatra reports, first, that political parties were able to grow and benefit from 
the rapidly growing economy.  They were able to exist outside of the traditional 
bureaucracy, garnering support from many “extra bureaucratic groups” and became 
effective and important in “policy-implementation and policy-making.”103 
 Second, there was an expanding role for the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).104  These organizations were important because they often 
represented the needs of people who were over looked in the traditional policy making 
process.  Usually, this meant poor people who did not have a strong affiliation with any 
party, lacking the money to invest and represent their interest.   
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 Third, growing “liberalization” was reflected in an increased freedom of 
intellectual expression in the media.105 “The stated continue to control radio and 
television, but there were increasing sign of independence, not only in selection and 
production of programs but also in coverage and presentation of news stories.”106  
 A fourth change was the liberalization of the armed forces.107 According to 
Paribatra here was a “newer generation of officers that were much more exposed to ideas 
and perspectives from the outside world than their predecessors.”108  They were more 
accepting of having a less direct role in politics, and of the “principle and practice of 
popular political participation.”109 
 These changes were indicative of larger social and economic changes that were 
taking place in society post-1978.  The economy grew in “an unprecedented manner, 
reaching double digit growth rate at the end of the 1980’s.  Also unprecedented was its 
integration into global trade, investment communication and informational systems.”110  
The level of education rose at an unprecedented rate and the number of people with 
higher education in the 1980’s was up to 15% from 2% in the 1960s.111 
Liberalization does not mean Democratization 
 Although there were liberalizing changes, as described above, they did not result 
in actual democracy.  Despite the changes, the political parties failed “to institutionalize 
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themselves as true representative of the people.”112  The old ways of influencing policy, 
such as through the bureaucratic system of patronage, still held sway.  This left out the 
majority of the population, meaning those who did not have money or connections.  The 
political parties mostly formed ties and were accountable to “big businesses” or “local 
magnates,” who they could depend on for electoral success.113  They did not put much 
effort into establishing “grass roots” organizations to connect with larger amounts of 
people, because they did not need their support for “electoral success” or “political 
achievement.”114  As a result, they were not accountable to the majority of the people.  
And because this type of relationship between business and politician proved to be 
lucrative, elections were rarely fair or clean.115  This type of electoral system did not 
“promote, either in quantitative or qualitative terms, voluntary political participation.”116  
The failure of these political parties led to the continuation of the strength of certain state 
structures: 
“The political changes that had begun in the early 1970’s left largely unaltered 
the organizational attributes of civilian and military bureaucracies with their 
capacity, buttressed by a vast body of laws, decrees, and legal or administrative 
precedents, to preserve for themselves extensive areas of responsibility in policy 
formulation and implementation, especially in rural areas.”117 
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These bureaucracies insulated themselves from change by condemning politicians and 
voluntary political participation as corrupt and inefficient, while claiming that they 
represented and protected the nation’s “true” interests.”118 
 The most powerful enduring bureaucracy remained the military.  While it is true 
that they had liberalized in some respects, their interest in remaining in power was the 
same and at odds with objectives of democracy.  They justified their continued presence 
in politics by claiming they alone could protect the “Nation, Religion, and Monarchy,” 
and thus were the protectors of national security.119  They reserved the right to intervene 
politically whenever they saw the need.  “All of this suggests that the military rejected the 
underlying ideals and political consequences of Western-style liberal democracy, and 
preferred bureaucratically guided liberalization expressed in terms of limited, controlled 
participation that emphasized consensus over competition, a minimally active legislature 
over an active and potent one, appointments over elections, and centralization over 
decentralization of power.”120 
1991 Coup 
 The idea that elections would not result in efficient and honest government was 
still widespread, not just among the military, but among proponents of democracy as 
well.  There was fear that “there was no guarantee that free elections would bring 
competent, honest people to the legislature” and that “political parties were basically no 
more than “trading companies,” corrupt and bent on pursuit of power and self-
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interest.”121  This was the rationale of the military leaders who led the coup in 1991.  In 
accordance with the right they reserved for themselves in politics, they declared that in 
order to protect the national interest, they needed to intervene and put a new government 
in place.  The existing Chatichai government was seen to be highly corrupt. With the 
blessing of the King, the coup was carried out by a the military junta – called the National 
Peacekeeping Council - led by General Suchinda.122  The author David Van Praagh 
describes in his book, “Struggle for Democracy” how the NPC “dissolved the legitimate 
government and the parliament and imposed martial law…the high command abolished 
the 1978 constitution as amended in 1983 to limit military influence.” 123   
 This coup was regarded as a huge set back for the growth of democracy.  This 
was the first time direct military intervention had taken place since 1978.  At this point in 
time, Thai society, especially the middle class, had developed to the point that it would 
no longer be acceptable to have prolonged military control of the government.  Many 
tolerated the justification for the coup, but they expected the military to hand back power 
as quickly as they could. 
 At the onset, the military made promises reassuring the public they would not be 
in power for long.  They scheduled elections to take place in the following year, and 
General Suchinda promised he would relinquish power and not run for the position of 
Prime Minister. They also put in place an “interim” constitution and government, 
approved by the King, just five days after the coup.  The new government was led by the 
appointed Prime Minister Anand, who was “nonpolitical” and was known for his work in 
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the “Thai foreign ministry as ambassador to the united states, the united nations, Canada, 
and West Germany.”124  His interim government was filled with “technocrats and 
businessmen” and was mostly non-corrupt and fairly progressive in trying to implement 
social and economic reforms.125 
Aftermath of the Coup 
 While on the surface it seemed that power would be back in the hands of civilians 
after the next elections, changes were enacted by the military that began to cast doubt on 
their original promise. The junta began to consolidate their power in a number of ways.  
As Van Praagh reports, they “stacked the interim legislative assembly to draft a new 
constitution and pass laws, with 148 military officers making up a majority of 292 
members.”126  To get rid of labor unrest, they outlawed labor unions; and in their 
investigation of “corrupt” official in the previous government, they “announced that the 
inquiry into corruption in high places would not extend to well-to-do military officers.”127  
Suchinda, despite his promise not to become involved in politics, set up a political party 
called the “Justice Unity Party” that was set to run in the upcoming elections.128  The 
junta also promoted changes to the new constitution that would further consolidate their 
hold on the government, by supporting “an appointed senate equal or greater in power to 
an elected lower house.”129 
 The public was alarmed at the changes taking place.  The fear that the military 
junta was not just temporarily removing a corrupt government, but would remain in 
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power, was becoming more real by the day.  The public felt that the military was staging 
a “constitutional coup.”130  As a result, a significant protest against the interim 
constitution took place, harkening back to the events of 1973, but now almost 20 years 
later.  Numbering around 100,000 people, this protest was called the “largest pro-
democracy protest since October 1973 student-led march.”131 
 The reaction by the military was split.  They got rid of some pro-military tenets, 
decreasing the power of junta-appointed senate.  However, many of the provisions 
stayed. One faction wanted to get rid of all democratic provisions; to create an appointed 
senate that was more powerful than the lower house and to allow that the prime minister 
not be an elected MP.132  The protestors saw the weakness in this indecision by the junta  
and decided to schedule another protest.133  At this moment, the King decided to 
intervene.  On his birthday broadcast, he told the Thai people “that compromise had gone 
as far as it could for the time being, and further pressure on the military might cause 
another coup and deeper division in Thailand.”134 As a result, the second protest was 
called off, and the new constitution, with the “retrogressive” provision for the senate, was 
ratified.135 
Elections of 1992 and Aftermath 
 The importance of the creation of the military’s political party became apparent 
after the 1992 elections.  Their party was able to create a pro-military coalition that 
captured enough seats to become the majority, thus allowing one of their own to become 
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prime minister.  After a few days of debate, Suchinda emerged as the man they wanted to 
represent their coalition and to be the prime minister. 
 These events were the final straw for the people.  They were outraged at the 
results of the elections, which they saw as clearly manipulated in favor the military.  But 
what was even more upsetting was that Suchinda had gone back on his word.  His 
justification for the coup was to displace the current corrupt government, and to give 
power back to the people so that they could create a truly democratic government.  “Not 
many had mourned the overthrow of the Chatichai government because of its alleged 
corrupt practices; nor did many voice their opposition to the forceful dissolution of the 
1978 constitutional system that was perceived to have made such a corrupt regime 
possible.”136  Suchinda had promised that the military would step aside, and that he 
personally would not attempt to become prime minister.  But with this final act, it became 
“evident to many that the junta took over for the sake of monopolizing power,” and that 
Suchinda had positioned himself so that he may stay in power as prime minister.137  In all 
of these actions, the King had not stood in the way. 
Protests Begin Again 
 In May 1992, just after the elections in March, the peaceful protests began. The 
public was outraged by the military’s blatant attempt to stay in power despite their earlier 
promises.  Academics began writing opinions that Suchinda was unlawfully occupying 
the office of prime minister and should step down immediately.  Suchinda responded by 
refusing to step down.  The main leader of the protests, Chamlong, sat outside the 
parliament building, claiming that he would refuse to eat until Suchinda stepped down.  
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Soon, more than 80,000 Thais joined him in peaceful protest.  But Suchinda continued to 
remain adamant that he would not step down. 
 The composition of the protestors was much different than that of the student-led 
protests of 1976:.   
“Whereas the anti-military movement of the early 1970’s was led by and 
consisted of students and the more radical elements of Thai society, the anti-
suchinda movement was very broad based both in leadership and rank-in-file 
participation.  Prominent among the leaders were elected politicians, former 
bureaucrats and military officers, NGO leaders and 1970’s-vintage student 
activists, many of whom were now involved in successful careers in the private 
sector.”138 
  
The protests began to escalate due to lack of response on the part of the Suchinda 
regime.  People were arriving in larger numbers and the atmosphere was beginning to 
turn from one of peace to one of tension and hostility.  Suchinda called in parts of the 
armed forces and riot police to contain the growing crowd.  Suchinda promised not to 
carry out acts of violence against the protestors, but did reserve the right to counter-attack 
in the event that the protestors became violent.  The presence of the police and armed 
forces added to the hostile environment, as the protestors became fearful of being 
provoked into violence.  Furthermore, because the state controlled the media, most of the 
coverage of events was “sharply slanted” towards the military-led government and 
“conveyed the impression that the protestors were troublemakers threatening law and 
order.”139  This unfair portrayal enraged the protestors even more. 
 The activists appealed to the King to help resolve the crises.140 They sent him a 
petition asking to dissolve the lower house of parliament and to hold new elections.  
Rather than take such bold action, the King responded by calling both members from the 
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government and opposition to come to some sort of compromise.  They agreed that there 
would be amendments made to the constitution, “including a requirement that the prime 
minister be an elected MP,” which would call for the resignation of Suchinda.141 
However, the leader Chamlong “called for a bigger rally than ever…if Suchinda and his 
allies did not keep their promise by then to go along with the constitutional changes that 
first and foremost, would force the prime minister to resign.”142 
 The deadline came but no amendments had been agreed upon.  The protests 
resumed, in larger numbers than ever before.  “Students and teachers, business and 
professional people, and workers and political activists” took to the streets and shouted 
“We will respect...the three institutions of nation, religion, and king!”143 The security 
forces reacted immediately, soaking the protestors with dirty water from water cannons.  
This act was said not so much to injure the crowd or prevent violence, but to provoke the 
middle class as this was highly disrespectful, and it had the intended effect - the 
protestors responded by throwing rocks at the police.144 
 The violence that erupted for the next three days was “the most violent use of 
force against civilians in the history of Bangkok.”145  Police and armed forced were 
allowed to fire directly on civilians.  Many instances of beatings and clubbings took 
place.  This level of violence was similar to that of 1976, but this time the violence lasted 
for three days.  The protestors, despite the extreme brutality, gave no sign of giving up.  
                                                        
141
 Van Praagh, p. 249 
142
 Ibid. 
143
 Id. p. 254 
144
 Ibid. 
145
 Paribatra, p. 889 
In fact, “its participants appeared ready to withstand more until the King’s intervention 
on the fourth night of the crises.”146 
The King’s Intervention and Aftermath 
  
 The King came on television with both Suchinda and the protest leader Chamlong 
at his feet.  It was said he “lectured Suchinda and Chamlong as if they were errant school 
boys.”147 The imagery of the scene conveyed just as much meaning as the words the King  
spoke.  He was seated above the other two, signifying that the monarchy remained above 
politics and any political figure.148  Both Suchinda and Chamlong were seated at the same 
height, signifying that both the military and the democracy movement were of equal 
status.149 In his speech the King said; 
“I would like both of you to talk face to face, not to confront each other, because 
this is our country.  They country belongs to us, not to two people…If this goes on, 
it will put the country in great danger, making Thailand a meaningless country.”150 
  
 The King’s statements supposedly encouraged constitutional liberalization and 
amounted to a rejection of the military’s presumptions and tactics.151  The King also let 
Suchinda know that he could resign before or after the amendments were made, but he 
made clear “that fulfillment of the first demand by the democracy movement was only a 
matter of timing.”152 
 With the King’s intervention, the violence ended, and Suchinda finally resigned 
his office of Prime Minister.  In his place, Anand was again set up as interim Prime 
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Minister, and with the aid of technocratic government, he “successfully restored political 
tranquility and behavioral decency,” to Thailand’s government.153  In addition, they 
“transferred the top members of the junta to inactive posts...and organized a relatively 
clean and orderly general election.” 154The new elections brought the Democrat party to 
power, “winning the most seats and leading to the appointment of their leader, Chuan 
Leekpai.”155 
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VI. COUP OF 2006. 
 
 The coup of 2006 is the most recent in Thai history and it is also the coup in 
which the King’s influence was most present.  But it was much different than the 
previous coups in 1976 and 1991.  Rather than a confrontation between military powers 
and a civilian movement, the impetus for the 2006 coup was a political figure, then Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his party.  Thaksin was elected into office in 2001 and 
remained there until the coup in 2006.  His party, their rise to power, and his tenure in 
office marked an important new era in Thai politics.   
 Thaksin was not a member of the traditional bureaucratic elite, nor did he have 
close personal relations with the King.  He came to power by unprecedented means in 
Thai political history, through open elections. The ideology embodied by his political 
party Thai Rak Thai (TRT) was a mixed one, which relied on the success of appealing 
both to the business elite and the rural masses.  Drawing support from these two 
demographics, he was able to achieve a sweeping victory in the 2001 elections.  
Essentially, there were three main reasons for the rise of Thaksin and his party:  the 
changes that took place under the 1997 constitution; the economic crisis of 1997; and the 
creation of the TKT and its unprecedented populist policies.  Each of these factors is 
explored briefly below. 
Constitutional changes 
 The 1997 constitution marked a significant moment in Thai political history.  As 
Scholar James Klein states in his article, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 
1997,” during the “first 60 years of Thailand’s constitutional history, there were no 
serious attempts to reform the political process and its associated problems of 
inefficiency and corruption.”156 The 1997 constitution was thus the first real attempt to 
establish meaningful constitutional authority and initiate reforms that could lead to a 
more accountable and democratic government.  “It establishes the constitution as the 
basis for all law, thereby reducing the bureaucracy power to subvert constitutional intent. 
For the first time in Thai history, it establishes a judicial review process independent of 
executive branch control, thereby enhancing both government accountability and the 
protection of civil liberties.”157  In addition, it was the first constitution to be written 
directly “by the people,” with a “99-member Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) was 
composed of two indirectly elected groups: 76 members representing each province, and 
23 recognized political, administrative, and legal experts.”158  Also unprecedented, the 
process was open to the public, allowing debate on many of the issues. 
 These reforms were spurred by the events of 1992.  The public was clearly 
displeased with the nature of politicians and government before the coup of 1991; and 
with the restoration of civilian government in 1992, they had high expectations for a new 
and reformed system.  It was clear they would not stand for going back to the corrupt 
practices of the past.  Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand summarize the people’s 
attitude towards the government at this time in their book, “The Thaksinzation of 
Thailand,” as follows: 
“Public dissatisfaction with the quality of Thai politicians and of the political 
system had produced growing demands for reform in the wake of May 
1992…Political parties were much-critized as factionalized alliances of interest 
groups, divorced from the concerns of the electorate.  Practice such as candidate-
buying (encouraging electable politicians to switch parties by using financial 
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inducements), vote-buying and the corruption of government officials made the 
electoral process wide open to manipulation and abuse.”159 
 
 The Constitution of 1997 was meant to address these issues by enacting liberal 
reforms that would change the system to increase public participation and put in place 
restrictions so as to decrease corruption and create a more accountable government.  
Scholar Sombat Chantornvong summarizes in Duncan McCargo’s book, “Reforming 
Thai Politics,” many of the changes that were made in the 1997 constitution.  Among 
these were the changes in election of the house to single-member constituency, the 
creation of a party list system, a new directly elected senate with increased powers as 
well as new restrictions, the creation of an Electoral Commission and other independent 
agencies such as the National Counter Corruption Commission, a Constitutional court, 
and a National Human Rights commission and new limitations making it more difficult 
for candidates to change parties.160   These changes were intended to create a stronger and 
more professional senate, free and fair elections, and to give more power and control to 
citizens over the government and bureaucracy.  While many of these changes proved 
difficult to fully implement and were far from successful, they did drastically alter what 
had been the traditional make-up of the political scene and the process of political life in 
Thailand. 
Economic crises of 1997 
 The second factor contributing to the rise of Thaksin and his political party was 
the economic crises of 1997 which came about, in part, due to massive speculation in 
regard to the Thai baht.  The party in power at that time, the New Aspiration Party, 
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refused to devalue the baht which led to the economic crises.  This crises helped bring 
about Thaksin’s rise to power in two ways: it led to the downfall of the Democratic Party, 
which had taken over, and it caused many “business” families to become directly 
involved in politics. 
 The Democratic Party took over as the economic crises set in.  As written by 
Kevin Hewison in “A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup,” the Democratic Party came to 
power in 1998 when the previous party failed to solve the financial crises.161  The 
Democratic Party’s solution was to accept an offered IMF bailout.  The measures 
imposed by the IMF involved “financial restructuring, accelerated privatization, massive 
state and corporate reforms and huge inflows of foreign investment.”162  However, these 
measures drove Thailand further into recession and the Democratic Party suffered 
significant loss of support as a result.  They were “accused of destroying domestic 
capitalism and ceding sovereignty over economic policy to outsiders and engaging in the 
fire sale of Thai assets to foreigners.”163  This situation helped clear the way for Thaksin, 
a self-made billionaire with significant business experience, and his party that supported 
the rights of the business elite, to rise to power. 
 The second cause was the effect that the crises and the IMF policies had on the 
“big business families” or the business elite.  Previously, the business elite had remained 
behind the scenes, influencing policy indirectly by donating money to political parties.  
This changed after the economic crises of 1997 when they realized they could benefit and 
protect their interests if they were more directly involved in politics.  In addition, the 
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liberal reforms that took place under the new constitution lowered the barriers of entry 
into the political scene.  As cited by Patana Tangpianpant in her thesis “Thaksin 
Populism and Beyond:”  
“Thaksin and his close allies…took advantage of the situation…and created a 
new party that was composed of primarily big business families.  This party was 
called Thai Rak Thai (TRT)…Their objectives were to use political power in 
order to rid the country of the IMF, to stop foreign firms and investments from 
taking over local businesses, and more generally to direct economic growth their 
way.  Thaksin’s party represented the rise of the businesspeople as politicians.”164 
 
The rise of TRT 
 
 The third reason for the rise of Thaksin has to do directly with the message and 
success of his political party.  The constitutional reforms had altered the political system 
that paved the way for the emergence of TRT.  The economic crises gave purpose to 
creation of Thaksin’s party and for his entry into the political scene.  But another change 
took place that was perhaps the most significant.  “Thaksin recognized that the 1997 
constitution demanded a different politics.  Previously, political parties relied on vote 
buying and influential local figures to deliver voters and power.  TRT hit on a different 
strategy, deciding to get its votes by appealing directly to voters.”165   
 This was the first time that broad populist policies were promoted by a political 
party in Thai history.  In the 2001 elections, TRT played on the problems which existed 
as the result of the economic crises - they promoted the rights of the business elite, but 
they also promised to “pour government money into rural areas,” in the form of social 
programs such as “universal health care, soft loans for every community, a three year 
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debt moratorium for farmers, and a “peoples” bank.”166  No one had ever appealed to the 
rural masses in such a way before, and the result was very clear.  The support of the rural 
masses combined with that of the business elite led Thaksin to a resounding victory in the 
2001 elections, capturing 12 million votes, or around 40 percent of the total vote.  “The 6 
January 2001 elections completely reshaped the political landscape in Thailand: on 9 
February 2001, 339 of the 500 MP’s in the new lower house voted for Thaksin to become 
prime minister.  This was an unprecedented parliamentary majority.”167  
Time in office and rise of the opposition 
 Thaksin came into office riding a wave of popular support.  However, his regime 
got off to a tumultuous start when he was accused of concealing assets prior to his 
election.  “In 2000, the NCCC voted 8:1 in favor of punishing Thaksin…Nevertheless the 
case was never brought to trial.”168  Once he got into office the issue was brought before 
the Constitutional Court.  Thaksin rushed his populist policies through, recognizing that 
he as long as he maintained popular support the courts could not condemn him or risk 
massive protests.169  As a result, the Constitutional Court voted Thaksin not guilty.  
 Despite this initial setback, Thaksin and his party were successful in the early 
years in office.  “The economy recovered and domestic capital was strengthened.”170  
Thaksin and his party enjoyed another landslide victory in the 2005 elections, winning 
42% of the vote.  
 Nonetheless, opposition began to surface in a number of different places to 
Thaksin’s regime.  First were the enterprise unions, who had previously supported the 
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TRT due to their opposition to the IMF regulations.  However, as the government began 
to privatize, these unions began to organize rallies and “accuse Thaksin and his allies as 
benefitting by the sale of the state enterprises.”171 
 Second, the public at large began to grow wary of Thaksin’s regime.  By 2006, his 
regime had become increasingly repressive, relying on tactics such as censorship of the 
media and political imprisonment to silence people who opposed his rule.  In addition, 
while many members of the middle class had originally supported his “war on drugs” in 
southern Thailand, as huge human rights violations began to surface, many became 
horrified and withdrew their support.  “There were more than 2000 extra-judicial killings 
in an anti-drugs campaign and sometimes brutal efforts to control southern separatism.  A 
number of human rights activists also disappeared or were killed in this period.”172  The 
autocratic nature of his regime was alarming to many who had supported his rise to 
power. 
 Perhaps the most dangerous and influential opposition came from the bureaucratic 
elite and the monarchy.  Thaksin’s reign and newfound power challenged the traditional 
bureaucratic elite that had been in power since the 1932 revolution.  Thaksin used his 
position to reallocate positions of power within the government by promoting friends and 
family that were loyal to him and his party, while displacing those that were not.   
 As for the King, he “appeared to personally dislike the arrogant Thaksin.”173  He 
made statements that openly criticized Thaksin and his party.  In addition to the attack on 
the power of the bureaucratic elite, which the King relied on to protect the interests of the 
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throne, Thaksin had tread on another significant source of the King’s support, the rural 
masses.  Kevin Hewison states in his article “Thai-Style Democracy” that: 
“The most significant political contest was for the hearts and minds of the 
masses.  A central ideological component of the monarchy’s position is the 
portrayal of the king as the champion of the poor..The palace has portrayed the 
monarchy as the savior of the poor peasants, through notions of suffiecny and 
palace charity.  Thaksin offered a different approach to the same 
constituency.”174 
 
The appeal and power Thaksin had over the rural masses as result of his populist policies 
posed a direct challenge to what had previously belonged to the King.  This fear was 
heightened as Thaksin coasted to another sweeping victory in 2005.  While many had 
begun to withdraw their support from Thaksin, it was clear the rural masses still 
supported him. 
The sale of Shin Corporation 
  A diverse opposition was gathering against Thaksin.  The anti-Thaksin 
movement was given cause to rally against him when he sold the Shin Corporation in 
January 2006.  “The Shinawatra family sold 49.61% of its shares to Temasek Holdings, a 
Singapore government investment company, for 73.3 billion baht, (US $ 1.7 billion).”175  
Large-scale protests began when people found out the Thaksin family had paid no tax on 
the sale.  In addition, just days before the sale was completed, the telecommunications 
law had been changed to allow foreign ownership to extend from 25 to 49 percent, 
allowing Thaksin’s family to sell more of their shares.  Demonstrations began as a result.  
There was considerable “middle class moral outrage” as many people saw this act as 
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representative of the “nepotism and cronyism of the Thaksin administration.”176  Middle 
class led NGO’s became the main orchestrators of the demonstrations against Thaksin. 
 As the demonstrations drew large numbers, an opposition party was formed, 
identified as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).  They charged Thaksin with 
corruption and called for new “free and fair” elections.  The old bureaucratic elite joined  
the movement as well, but by appealing more to nationalist sentiments and arguing that 
Thaksin was disrespectful to the monarchy, and thus a threat to the nation as a whole.  
Conditioned by decades, People began to call on the monarch to intervene and “save” the 
country from this immoral and corrupt figure. 
 Thaksin, seeing his power slipping, called for a new election in April 2006.  
Elections were held, but the PAD boycotted, allowing TRT to coast to an easy victory.  It 
was at this point that King Bhumibol stepped in and declared that the elections were 
undemocratic due to allegations of electoral fraud.  He decided to send the issue to the 
judiciary for judgments, annulled the results of the elections, and rescheduled new 
elections for September 2006.177   
September 2006 
 The King’s actions had potent ramifications.  It became very clear that the palace 
wanted Thaksin out of power, and so it would only be a matter of time before a coup took 
place.  Therefore, “the anti-Thaksin campaign then became a struggle for control of the 
military,” as their support would be instrumental in implementing a coup.178  As a result, 
people who had formally been political enemies came together in their mutual opposition 
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to Thaksin.  The wariness of military involvement that had been present since the 1976 
coup broke down. 
 On September 19, 2006, with the consent of the king, a military group led by 
General Sonthi imposed a coup against the Thaksin regime.  The junta named itself the 
“Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic system with the King as the Head 
of State.”179  In article titled “Thailand: Military Coup 2006,” the Asian Human Rights 
Commission outlined the following actions of the military upon seizing power: “Within 
hours of taking power, the army abrogated the constitution, banned political assemblies, 
commenced extralegal arrests, and authorized censorship.”180  The new leaders organized 
a Council for Democratic Reform that issued a statement explaining their reasons for the 
coup and stating that they would return the government to democratic rule in one year.  In 
addition, there would be an investigation into the suspect activities of TRT during the 
previously annulled election. 
Aftermath and Consequences 
 As we have seen, coups have been an important element in Thai politics.  Many 
people have supported them and seen them as a means to restore government on its 
rightful path towards democracy.  They believe that if the intentions of the coup are for 
the good of the people and nation, than the coup can be justified, despite its inconsistency 
with a truly democratic process.  It cannot be doubted that the monarchy, too, has had a 
role in these events and this thinking.  
 Such was the mindset of the majority of Thai’s towards the 2006 coup.  To many, 
it seemed apparent that Thaksin was no better, if not worse, than the previous corrupt 
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self-seeking politicians.  “The Thaksin government was a civilian autocracy.  It did not 
respect human right, the rule of law or democratic principles.  It manipulated the media, 
intimidated its opponents, and played with legislation and public institution for its own 
advantage.”181  There is no denying the undemocratic nature of the Thaksin regime.  But 
the ramifications of the coup were not limited to the removal of this particular person 
from office. The consequences really like are in regards to the motives of the coup, the 
constitution of 1997, and the general uncertainty of the democratic future in Thailand. 
 The motives behind the coup highlight the sentiments of the bureaucratic elite. 
Thaksin’s reign posed a threat to the old bureaucratic elite and to traditional sources of 
power.  Because of this, he was a threat to the support base of the King, including the 
King’s position as champion of the poor.  It was really for these reasons, and not because 
he was a corrupt politician, that actions were seen as necessary to remove him from 
office.  The understanding that the bureaucratic elite would outwardly support democratic 
growth, but not if it came at the risk of a direct challenge to their power, was 
demonstrated by the 2006 coup. 
 The constitution of 1997 was the most important in Thai history.  It was the first 
real attempt to move power away from the traditional bureaucratic elite and give it to “the 
people.”  It was not just that institutional changes that took place with it, but that this 
constitution “marked a great advance in the thinking of people in Thailand on 
constitutional issues and the management of their society.”182.  When the military took 
over in 2006 and removed the first popularly elected prime minister in Thai history, and 
then dissolved the constitution that mandated it, it was a serious setback for the 
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democratic movement.  The work and effort that had gone into initiating these reforms 
and changes, beginning with the events of 1992, had now been erased.  The political 
ramifications were clear with the new constitution written in the aftermath of the 2006 
coup, shifting some of the power back to the bureaucratic elite.  But the psychological 
consequences felt in society were perhaps the most damaging part of the 2006 coup.  
They future of their democratic growth was now uncertain as ever.  And the monarchy, 
while beloved by the people, had a clear role in the setback. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  
 This concluding chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, I will 
analyze the three “key event” chapters in terms of the King’s actions.  Second, I will 
discuss the consequences of his actions in regard to how they affected the democratic 
transition process.  Third, I will consider Huntington’s theories in connection with the 
role of the king in Thailand.  Lastly, I will offer my predictions for the future of 
democracy in Thailand. 
Events of 1973-76, 1992, and 2006.  
 The events of 1973-76, 1992, and 2006 provide unmistakable evidence of the 
direct role the King plays in Thai politics.  They also underscore the motives behind the 
King’s actions in each case - that is his conservative mentality and long-lasting 
relationship with the military, and not his supposed support for democratic reform. 
 The actions of the King during 1973 and 1976 on the surface seem contradictory.  
In one example, he sided “with democracy,” and in the other he acted against it.  In 1992, 
he stepped in again, this time ostensibly in favor of democracy.  In 2006, he supported a 
coup that deposed a “corrupt and immoral” politician.  On the surface some would argue 
this is an undemocratic action, but many thought of the coup as positive and necessary for 
democracy in that it was essential to rid the government of a corrupt ruler and set 
Thailand on the path back towards democracy. I contend these were not actions taken to 
further democracy.  Rather, the King’s actions are explained more by his conservatism.  
Conservatism stresses the perseveration of the old order that embodies the traditional 
values and customs of Thailand, as well as the importance of stability and unity above all 
other things. In all of these circumstances, conditions of upset were threatening the 
stability of Thailand, as well as challenging the security of the “old order.”   
 The King’s intervention in 1973 was in response to mass protests that resulted in 
violence.  In 1976, the radicalization of the student movement became a destabilizing 
force to society. In 1992 social tension had risen in the form of mass protest that resulted 
in violence once again.  The year 2006 presented a similar situation, with rising social 
tension due to popular dissatisfaction with the regime of Thaksin.  Consistent with the 
King’s conservative objectives, the purpose of his intervention in all of these 
circumstances was to restore stability and unity to society, not necessarily to further 
democratic reforms. 
 The second critical element in evaluating all these events is the King’s  
relationship with the military.  The King and the military enjoy a “symbiotic relationship” 
in Thailand.183 They rely on one another to further their own objectives.  The military 
needs (at least tacitly) the support of the King in their political objectives.  The King 
needs the military to protect “the continuity of the throne” and “national security.”184  In 
the event that a threat is posed to either of these things, the King will support the military 
to intervene on his behalf.   
 I recognize it is fair to say, as is shown by the events of 1973 and 1992, that the 
King will sometimes side against the military.  The reason for this is due to concern for 
the debilitating effect military rule would have on society at that time.  If his ultimate 
goal of stability and unity come at the cost of siding against the military, then he has done 
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so. But this is not necessarily to encourage full democracy at the expense of the military 
in its place. 
 The relationship between the King and the military is reflected in the key events 
of 1976, 1991 and 2006.  In 1976, the radical student movement was challenging the “old 
order” and “traditional” values of Thailand.  In 1991, corrupt politicians were 
destabilizing the functionality of government, which resulted in social turmoil that 
threatened national security.  In 2006, Thaksin challenged the old order and the values 
embodied in the traditional elite.  The King supported the military at times in these events 
to protect the national interest, to protect these traditional values, and to restore or 
maintain the continued influence of the throne. 
Consequences of actions 
 While the King’s actions were guided by his sense of conservatism and his 
relationship with the military, they were also guided by his sense of divine right. The 
King sees himself as the father of the country, and therefore believes that he alone knows 
what is best for the people in the end.  Many in the populace also see his role from this 
perspective.  In addition, because the institution of the monarchy has always been the 
unifying symbol of Thai society, the King  believes he must  carry on the tradition of 
upholding the values, customs and traditions that are so central to Thai life.  From this 
perspective, the presence of the king in Thai politics is crucial, in that he provides 
political stability. As Hewison writes,  “The King and the People become one. The 
Throne and the Nation become one, and a profound meaning is thus given to the Throne.  
It becomes the personification of Thai nationhood, the symbol of the Nation’s unity and 
independence, the invariable constant above the inconsistencies of politics.” 185  The 
King’s continued presence in politics is therefore seen not only appropriate, but is also 
expected and necessary.  This role he plays in Thai society is another justification for his 
interventionist behavior. 
 It would be extreme of course to say that the King’s  interventions are always 
negative.  My argument is that his interventionist behavior as a pattern is detrimental to 
the growth of democracy in the long run.  It can be helpful in specific situations.  For 
example, in 1973 and 1991, the King did represent and respond to the requests of his 
people.  In answer to their protests, he protected their interests and sided against the 
military.  No other figure could have done this in Thailand at that time, and the popular 
protests were not going to overcome the military.   
 This was especially the case in 1973 when the military was all-powerful and had 
been ruling for many years.  Despite the initial revolution in 1932, the democratic 
transition had really progressed very little.  There were no representative institutions that 
could channel the needs of the people, let alone bring about any dramatic change.  
Whatever his intentions or motivations, at this point in time the King did help the 
democratic process. However, with the coup in 1976, only three years later this success 
was short lived. 
 In 1991 a similar situation unfolded.  It is true that circumstances were much 
different at this time.  The military was less powerful and had taken a back seat 
politically since the civilian government had been in place.  In addition, the people had 
developed a greater political consciousness due to the rise of a new middle class and 
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increase in wealth and education.  These were not just radical students protesting- it was a 
significant and respectable portion of the Thai population.  One would say that these 
circumstances gave more democratic hope to the situation than the circumstances of 
1973.  
  Despite the liberalization that had taken place, democratic institutions were still 
struggling.  The violent response by the military to the 1992 protests signified the need 
for an intervention.  The King again played an important role in this situation, standing 
up for the people, when there was no one else that could do so.  But that did not mean 
that democracy was at hand or that democracy was the King’s goal  
 2006 offers a much different situation.  By this time Thailand had produced the 
first “peoples’ constitutions,” and had held, voted and successfully placed in office the 
first popularly elected government.  In the constitution was the creation of new 
institutions of accountability to increase transparency in the government and to decrease 
corruption.  While these democratic institutions were far from perfect, they were 
important because they reflected the desire of the people for a truly representative 
government.   
 Due to these circumstances, the intervention by the King and the support of the 
2006 coup is a contentious issue.  The argument that his intervention was “in the interest 
of the people” or “for the sake of democracy” does not stand the same way it arguably 
did  in the 1973 and 1992 conflicts.   
 First and foremost, while there was massive opposition to Thaksin, there were still 
many who supported him.  It would certainty not be in their interest to have him 
removed.  Second, while it appears  rue that Thaksin was a corrupt and authoritative 
ruler, the justification for the coup, which was to restore Thailand on the rightful path to 
democracy, does not hold because he was removed via undemocratic means.  In addition, 
the democratic institutions created by the 1997 constitution were all dissolved.  This 
would not strengthen democracy nor does it represent the people’s interest. 
 I believe an important reason these interventions do not contribute to the overall 
growth of democracy is because the King’s aim in the end is not to further democracy.  
He intervenes only in times of crises, and when he does, it is to restore the status quo, 
whatever that may be.  While in the aftermath there was some progress, it was only a 
matter of time before undemocratic actions resumed.  The King’s political agenda is 
shaped by the sentiment that what is good and necessary for the country foremost is the 
survival of the monarchy, because only the King can truly act in the people’s interest in 
critical moments.  The King points to these times of crises as examples of why this 
sentiment is true. 
 Indeed, I argue it is the absence of stronger democratic institutions that is the 
reason for these interventions.  And while this was understandable in the early stages of 
the transition before these institutions had time to grow, there comes a point where it is 
no longer acceptable. The continuation of the King’s interventionist behavior prevents 
democratic institutions from truly evolving and so the people continue to rely on him.  
Theories Revisited- Transformation and the Role of the Monarchy 
Transformation 
 Under Huntington’s theory of transition, Thailand’s democratic transition is 
considered a transformation because the transition was initiated by the regime that was in 
power at that time.  Consistent with Huntington’s theory, the reformers within the regime 
initiated the transition.  At the time there was little existence of organized opposition.  In 
addition, while there were “standpatters” in the regime, mostly in the royal family, they 
had lost much of their political power and popular support.  The reformers did not meet 
much resistance from either party.  These conditions allowed for the transition to be 
initiated in Thailand with relative ease. 
 The reformers were members of the bureaucratic elite and the military. They 
advocated for a change from the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.  Their 
desire for political change resulted from problems in society that had been created due to 
modernizing changes.  These changes put pressure on the political system of the absolute 
monarchy.  The government was unable to address or solves these tensions and problems, 
and as a result popular dissatisfaction grew, and doubt was cast on their ability to govern.  
This situation called for the need to reform. 
 For quite some time the transition was halted, as the military reformers 
consolidated power for themselves in the time period from 1933-1956.  Eventually the 
process began again.  It was in this period that Huntington’s theory of “backward 
legitimacy” was implemented.  As was evidenced in the “history of the king’s” chapter, 
the monarchy was the traditional source of legitimacy in society, and therefore played the 
role of initiating and directing change.  Sarit resurrected this source of legitimacy for  
Bhumibol, and used it to legitimize the current democratic process. The transition would 
move forward, but only with the consent of the King as the legitimizing force.  
Democratic reform was thus tied inexorably with the King and his actions and 
motivations.  It was through this method that the standpatters could be appeased, and the 
reformers in the regime could maintain some level of control over the process.  
The Role of the Monarchy in Transformation 
 Using the King as a source of legitimacy to further the democratic transition can 
work, but only up to a point. As with the problem of interventionist behavior, the success 
of the transition necessitates the King’s involvement in the beginning, but then 
democratic institutions and practices much be allowed to evolve and take hold. In order 
for democracy to succeed, the King must transfer his source of traditional legitimacy over 
to these institutions. This has not happened.  I maintain the role and actions of the King 
have prevented real democracy from being able to grow and mature, due to his continued 
hold over traditional legitimacy and authority. 
The Future 
 “The future of existing traditional monarchies is bleak.”186  This is the situation 
the institution of the monarchy in Thailand must face.  The current King has reigned for 
64 years.  It seems that kind of change in regards to the monarchy’s position in Thailand 
will not take place before he dies.  However, because the institution of the monarchy has 
become so personalized to him due to the longevity of his reign, it is possible his death 
many bring about real changes.   
 If the democratic transition is to proceed to maturity, it is inevitable that the 
monarchy must hand over the traditional, ultimate source of authority.  As British scholar 
Vernon wrote,  “Constitutional monarchy” is a “contradiction in terms, because, by 
definition, monarchy is an absolutist system of government.”187 Constitutional 
monarchies work in other countries because there the monarchy has given up his 
traditional source of legitimacy.  The democratic transition in Thailand will continue to 
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suffer until this full transfer of power takes place and society can turn away from the 
King as the institution of ultimate resort. 
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